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Abstract—Crowdsourcing has arisen as a new problem-solving
paradigm for tasks that are difficult for computers but easy
for humans. However, since the answers collected from the re-
cruited participants (workers) may contain sensitive information,
crowdsourcing raises serious privacy concerns. In this paper,
we investigate the problem of protecting answer privacy under
local differential privacy (LDP), by which individual workers
randomize their answers independently and send the perturbed
answers to the task requester. The utility goal is to enable to
infer the true answer (i.e., truth) from the perturbed data with
high accuracy. One of the challenges of LDP perturbation is the
sparsity of worker answers (i.e., each worker only answers a small
number of tasks). Simple extension of the existing approaches
(e.g., Laplace perturbation and randomized response) may incur
large error of truth inference on sparse data. Thus we design an
efficient new matrix factorization (MF) algorithm under LDP. We
prove that our MF algorithm can provide both LDP guarantee
and small error of truth inference, regardless of the sparsity of
worker answers. We perform extensive experiments on real-world
and synthetic datasets, and demonstrate that the MF algorithm
performs better than the existing LDP algorithms on sparse
crowdsourcing data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing enables to perform tasks that are easy for
humans but remain difficult for computers. Typically, a task
requester releases the tasks on a crowdsourcing platform
(e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)). Then the workers
provide their answers to these tasks on the same crowdsourcing
platform in exchange for a reward. As the Internet and
mobile technologies continue to advance, crowdsourcing helps
organizations to improve productivity and innovation in a cost-
effective way.
While crowdsourcing provides an effective way for problem-
solving, collecting individual worker answers may pose po-
tential privacy risks on the workers. For instance, it has been
reported that AMT was leveraged by politicians to access a
large pool of Facebook profiles and collect tens of thousands
of individuals’ demographic data [2]. Crowdsourcing-related
applications such as participatory sensing [8] and citizen sci-
ence [7] also raise privacy concerns for the workers. However,
simply removing the worker names or replacing the names
with pseudo-names cannot adequately protect worker privacy.
It is still possible to de-anonymize crowd workers by matching
their inputs with external datasets [27].
Recently, differential privacy (DP) [17] has been used in many
applications to provide rigorous privacy guarantee. Classical
DP requires a centralized trusted data curator (DC) to collect
all the answers and publish privatized statistical information.
However, as crowdsourcing services become increasingly pop-
ular, many untrusted task requesters (or DCs) appear to abuse
the crowdsourcing services by collecting private information
of the workers (see the aforementioned example that AMT
was leveraged by politicians). In recent years, local differential
privacy (LDP) [15] arises as a good alternative paradigm to
prevent an untrusted DC from learning any personal infor-
mation of the data providers and provides per-user privacy.
In LDP, each data provider randomizes his/her data to satisfy
DP locally. Then the data providers send their randomized
answers to the (untrusted) DC, who aggregates the data with
no access to personal information of data providers. LDP roots
in randomized response, first proposed in [48]. It has been used
in many applications such as Google’s Chrome browser [19],
[20] and Apple’s iOS 10 [1].
The goal of this paper is to protect worker privacy with LDP
guarantee for crowdsourcing systems. We aim to address two
main challenges.
Challenge 1: sparsity of worker answers. The worker
answers can be very sparse, as often times most workers
only provide answers to a very small portion of the tasks. For
example, the analysis of a real-world crowdsourcing dataset,
named AdultContent dataset1, which includes the relevance
ratings of 825 workers for approximately 11,000 documents,
shows that the dataset has the average sparsity as high as
99% (i.e., each worker rates 70 documents at average). The
NULL values in worker answers (i.e., missing answers from
the workers) should be protected, as they reveal the sensitive
1http://dbgroup.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/ligl/crowddata
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information as whether a worker has participated in specific
tasks [13]. However, careless perturbation of NULL values
may alter the original answer distribution and incur significant
inaccuracy of truth inference. However, most of the LDP
works (e.g., [5], [4], [37], [46]) only consider complete data.
None of these works address the sparsity issue.
Challenge 2: data utility. One of the major utility goals
of crowdsourcing systems is to aggregate the answers from
workers of different (possibly unknown) quality, and infer the
true answer (i.e., truth) of each task. Truth inference [32], [51]
has been shown as effective to estimate both worker quality
and the truth. Most of the existing truth inference mechanisms
follow an iterative process: both worker quality and inferred
truth are estimated and updated iteratively, until they reach
convergence. This makes it extremely difficult to preserve the
accuracy of truth inference on the perturbed worker answers,
as even the slight amount of initial noise on the worker answers
may be propagated during iterations and amplified to the final
truth inference results.
Matrix factorization is one of the most popular methods to
predict NULL values. Intuitively, by matrix factorization, the
answers of a specific worker can be modeled as the multipli-
cation of a worker profile vector and a task profile matrix. We
observe that the adaption of a worker profile vector only relies
on the worker’s own answers rather than those of other work-
ers. Therefore, matrix factorization can be performed locally.
However, applying LDP to matrix factorization is not trivial.
A direct application of LDP on the worker answers can incur
a large perturbation error that linearly grows with the number
of tasks. Most of the existing methods of matrix factorization
with LDP [24], [40], [41], [42] only consider recommender
systems. They cannot be applied to the crowdsourcing setting
directly due to the mismatched utility function; they consider
the accuracy of recommendation while we consider the ac-
curacy of truth inference. Furthermore, some of these works
(e.g., [24], [42]) require iterative feedbacks between the data
curator and users, which may incur expensive communication
overhead.
Contributions. To our best knowledge, this is the first work
that provides privacy protection on sparse worker answers
with LDP guarantee, while preserving the accuracy of truth
inference on the perturbed data. We summarize our main
contributions as follows. First, we present simple extension
of two existing perturbation approaches, namely Laplace per-
turbation (LP) and randomized response (RR), to deal with
sparse crowdsourcing data. We provide detailed analysis of
the expected error bound of truth inference for these two
approaches, and show that both LP and RR can have large error
of truth inference for sparse data. Second, we design a new
matrix factorization (MF) algorithm with LDP. To preserve the
accuracy of truth inference, we apply the perturbation on the
objective function of matrix factorization, instead of on the
matrix factorization results. Our formal analysis shows that
the theoretical error bound of truth inference results on the
perturbed data is small, and the error bound of truth inference
is insensitive to data sparsity. Finally, we conduct extensive ex-
periments on real-world and synthetic crowdsourcing datasets
of various sparsity. The experimental results demonstrate that
our MF approach significantly improves the accuracy of truth
inference on the perturbed data compared with the existing
work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
and III present the background and preliminaries. Section IV
introduces the extension of two existing approaches. Section
V discusses our MF mechanism. Section VI presents the
experiment results. Related work is discussed in Section VII.
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly recall the definition of local dif-
ferential privacy, and overview the truth inference algorithms.
The notations used in the paper are shown in Table I.
Symbol Meaning
m # of workers
n # of tasks
~ai Worker Wi’s original answer vector
aˆj Worker Wi’s answer vector after perturbation
ai,j Worker Wi’s answer to task Tj
Γ Domain of task answers (excluding NULL answers)
σi Standard deviation of worker Wi’s answer error
qi Estimated quality of worker Wi
µj /µˆj Real/estimated truth of task Tj
si Percentage of tasks that Wi returns non-NULL values
 Privacy budget
Ti The set of tasks that worker Wi performs
d Factorization parameter
TABLE I: Notations
A. Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
The need for data privacy arises in two different contexts: the
local privacy context in which the individuals disclose their
personal information (e.g., participation in surveys for specific
population), and the global privacy context in which the
institutions release aggregation information of their data (e.g.,
US Government releases census data). The classic concept of
differential privacy (DP) [17] is proposed in the global privacy
context. In a nutshell, DP ensures that an adversary cannot
infer whether or not a particular individual is participating
in the database query, even with unbounded computational
power and access to every entry in the database except for
that particular individual’s data. DP considers a centralized
setting that includes a trusted data curator, who generates the
perturbed statistical information (e.g., counts and histograms)
by using a randomized mechanism [23], [31], [35], [49].
Recently, a variant of DP, named local differential privacy
(LDP) [29], [15] was proposed for the decentralized setting
where multiple data providers send their private data to a
untrusted data curator. Before sending it to the data curator,
each data provider perturbs his private data locally by using
a differentially private mechanism. The randomized response
method [48] has been used to provide local privacy when
individuals respond to sensitive surveys. Intuitively, for a given
survey question, respondents provide a truthful answer with
probability p > 1/2 and lie with probability 1 − p. The
randomized response method provides (ln p1−p )-LDP [46].
While LDP considers per-user privacy, in this paper, we
consider per-user per-answer privacy. Therefore, by following
[38], we define a variant of LDP [15], named -cell local
differential privacy, below.
Definition 2.1 (-cell Local Differential Privacy). A random-
ized privatization mechanismM satisfies -cell local differen-
tial privacy (-cell LDP) iff for any pair of answer vectors ~a
and ~a′ that differ at one cell, we have:
∀~zp ∈ Range(M) : Pr[M(~a) = ~zp]
Pr[M(~a′) = ~zp] ≤ e
,
where Range(M) denotes the set of all possible outputs of
the algorithm M.
B. Truth Inference
The goal of truth inference is to infer the true answer (i.e.,
truth) by integrating the noisy answers from the workers. As
the workers may produce answers of different quality, most
of the existing truth inference algorithms take the quality of
workers into consideration. Intuitively, the answers by workers
of higher quality are more likely to be considered as the truth.
The challenge is that worker quality is usually unknown a
priori in practice. To tackle this challenge, quite a few truth
inference algorithms (e.g. [22], [34], [50], [10]) have been
designed to infer both worker quality and the true answers of
the tasks. Intuitively, worker quality and the inferred truth are
correlated: workers whose answers are closer to true answers
more often will be assigned higher quality, and answers
that are provided by high-quality workers will have higher
influence on the truth.
In this paper, we follow the truth inference algorithm [32],
[51] to estimate the true answers (truth) from the workers’
answers. Formally, given a set of workers W , and a set of
tasks T , for any worker Wi ∈ W , let Ti ⊆ T be the set of
tasks that worker Wi performs. For any task Tj ∈ Ti, let Wj be
the set of workers who perform it, ai,j be the answer that Wi
provides to Tj , µˆj be the estimated truth of Tj , and qi be the
quality of worker Wi ∈ W . We follow the same assumption
as that in [32], [51] that the error of worker Wi follows the
normal distribution N (0, σ2i ), where σi is the standard error
deviation of Wi. Intuitively, the lower σi is, the higher the
worker quality qi will be. We also follow the assumption in
most of the truth inference works (e.g., [32], [51]) that the
worker quality stays stable across all the tasks.
The truth inference algorithms [32], [51] follow an iterative
style. Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo-code. Initially, each
worker is assigned the same quality 1m . Then the weighted
average of the worker answers are computed as the estimated
truth. Specifically, the estimated truth µˆj of task Tj is com-
puted as:
µˆj =
∑
Wi∈Wj qi × ai,j∑
Wi∈Wj qi
(1)
Based on the estimated truth µˆj , the worker quality is updated
accordingly. Intuitively, if a worker provides accurate answers
more often, he/she has a better quality. Specifically, the quality
qi of worker Wi is inversely related to the total difference
between his answers and the estimated truth. We adopt the
weight estimation method [32] for worker quality. Namely,
the quality qi of worker Wi is computed as:
qi ∝ 1
σi
=
1√
1
|Ti|
∑
tj∈Ti (ai,j − µˆj)2
(2)
The estimated truth {µˆj} and worker quality {qi} are kept
updated iteratively until they reach convergence.
Algorithm 1: Truth inference
Require: The workers’ answers {ai,j}
Ensure: The estimated true answer (i.e., the truth) of tasks
{µˆj} and the quality of workers {qi}
1: Initialize worker quality qi = 1/m for each worker
Wi ∈ W;
2: while the convergence condition is not met do
3: Estimate {µˆj} following Equation (1);
4: Estimate {qi} following Equation (2);
5: end while
6: return {µˆj} and {qi};
To evaluate data utility, we use the mean absolute error (MAE)
to measure the accuracy of the inferred truth. Specifically,
MAE =
∑
Tj∈T |µj − µˆj |
n
, (3)
where µj (µˆj , resp.) is the real (estimated, resp.) true answer
of task Tj .
C. Matrix Factorization
One of the popularly used methods to handle missing values
is matrix factorization [30]. Formally, given a m × n matrix
M with NULL values, matrix factorization finds two profile
matrices U and V , where U is an m×d matrix and V is a d×n
matrix, such that M ≈ UV . The value d is normally chosen to
be smaller than m or n. We call d the factorization parameter.
We define the loss function [21] of matrix factorization:
L(M,U, V ) =
∑
(i,j)∈Ω
(Mi,j − ~uTi ~vj)2 (4)
where Ω is the set of observed answers in M . To ensure the
accuracy of the estimated U and V , an effective method is to
follow stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to learn two latent
matrices U and V that minimize the loss function:
(U, V ) = arg min
U,V
L(M,U, V ) (5)
By matrix factorization, each worker Wi is characterized by a
worker profile vector ~ui, and each task Tj is characterized by
a task profile vector ~vj . The worker Wi’s answer of task Tj ,
which is denoted as Mi,j , can be approximated by the inner
product of ~ui and ~vj , i.e., ~uTi ~vj .
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Crowdsourcing Framework
In general, a crowdsourcing framework consists of two parties:
(1) the task requester (TR) who generates the tasks and
releases them on a crowdsourcing platform (e.g., Amazon
Mechanical Turk [25]); (2) the workers who provide their
answers to the tasks via the crowdsourcing platform. For the
rest of the paper, we use the terms task requester (TR) and
data curator (DC) interchangeably.
Consider n tasks T = {T1, . . . , Tn} and m workers W =
{W1, . . . ,Wm}. Worker Wi’s answers are represented as a
row vector ~ai, in which the element ai,j denotes the answer
of worker Wi to the task Tj . We assume that all the answers
are in numerical format (e.g., image classification categories
and product ratings). The domain of non-NULL answers is
denoted as Γ. Each worker can access all the tasks in T (as
on Amazon Mechanical Turk), and choose a subset of task(s)
of T to provide answers. We denote ai,j = NULL if worker
Wi does not provide any answer to task Tj . We assume that
each worker performs at least one task (i.e., each answer vector
has at least one non-NULL value).
B. Problem Definition
We assume that DC is untrusted. Therefore, releasing the
original worker answers to DC may reveal sensitive informa-
tion. Obviously, non-NULL answers must be protected, since
they reveal the workers’ sensitive information (e.g., political
opinions and medical conditions). On the other hand, the
NULL values reveal the fact whether a worker participates
in a task or not. Such fact can be sensitive. For instance, in
medical research, a patient’s refusal to answer some questions
could reveal that the patient may have some specific diseases
and thus is not qualified to answer these questions [13].
Therefore, NULL values must be protected too. Our goal is
to design privacy-preserving algorithms to protect both non-
NULL answers and NULL values, while enable truth inference
with high accuracy on the collected worker answers. We
formalize the problem statement below.
Problem statement. Given a set of workers W , their answer
vectors A = {~ai}, and a non-negative privacy parameter ,
we design a randomized privatization mechanism M such
that for each worker Wi ∈ W and his/her answer vector
~ai, M provides -cell LDP on ai,j , for each ai,j of ~ai.
We prefer to minimize MAE of the truth inferred from
AP = {M(~ai)|∀~ai ∈ A}.
C. Our Solutions in a Nutshell
We first propose easy extension of two existing LDP ap-
proaches, namely the Laplace perturbation (LP) method
which applies perturbation on worker answers directly, and the
randomized response (RR) method that generates answers by
following a randomized way. Our theoretical analysis shows
that these easy extension of both LP and RR approaches
have large error bound of truth inference, especially when
the data is very sparse. Therefore, we design a new matrix
factorization (MF) privatization method to deal with sparse
worker answers under LDP. We observe that the adaption of a
worker profile vector only relies on the worker’s own answers
rather than those of other workers. Therefore, the matrix
factorization can be performed locally. However, applying
LDP to matrix factorization is not trivial. Some existing works
of differentially private matrix factorization [3], [21] assume
DC is trusted; they do not fit the LDP model. [24], [42] apply
LDP on matrix factorization. They follow the same strategy:
each worker generates his worker profile matrix locally, and
learns the task profile matrix by iterative communication with
DC, which can incur substantial communication overhead. To
address this issue, we design a new protocol by which: (1) DC
generates the task profile matrix initially (independent from
the worker answers), and sends it to the workers; and (2)
each worker learns the worker profile vector from his local
data only. This eliminates the communication between DC
and workers. LDP is achieved by adding perturbation on the
objective function of matrix factorization. We are aware that
a task profile matrix generated independently from the worker
answers is not as accurate as that learned from the worker
answers. There exists the trade-off between the overhead of
the LDP approach and the accuracy of truth inference. Both
of our theoretical and empirical analysis show that, even with
a task profile matrix that is independent from worker answers,
the error of truth inference results on the perturbed worker
answers is small.
IV. EXTENSION OF EXISTING LDP APPROACHES
In this section, we present the easy extension of two exist-
ing LDP approaches, namely Laplace perturbation (LP) and
randomized response (RR), to deal with data sparsity.
A. Laplace Perturbation (LP)
Laplace perturbation is one of the most well-known ap-
proaches to achieve DP. Typically Laplace perturbation is
applied on aggregation results (e.g., count and sum) in the
centralized setting. It can be easily extended to provide LDP by
adding Laplace noise to each worker answer independently. To
handle NULL values, a straightforward solution is to replace
NULL values with some non-NULL value in the answer
domain Γ. Formally, the NULL-value replacing strategy can
be defined as a conversion function g(·) as follows:
g(ai,j) =
{
v ai,j = NULL
ai,j ai,j 6= NULL,
(6)
where v is an non-NULL answer in Γ. After
conversion, Laplace noise is added to each
element in the answer vector ~ai. Formally,
L(~ai) =
(
g(ai,1)+Lap(
|Γ|

), g(ai,2)+Lap(
|Γ|

), ..., g(ai,n)+Lap(
|Γ|

)
)
,
(7)
The following theorem shows the privacy guarantee of the easy
extension of the LP approach.
Theorem 1. The LP mechanism guarantees -cell LDP for
both cases that g(·) replaces NULL with a constant value
in Γ and a random value picked by following any arbitrary
distribution over Γ.
Due to the space limit, we defer the proof to our full paper
[43]. One of the weakness of the LP approach is that it replaces
a large number of NULL values and may change the original
data distribution significantly. Next, we show the error bound
of the inferred truth from the answers with LP perturbation.
Theorem 2. Given a set of answer vectors A = {~ai}, let
AP = {aˆi} be the answer vectors after applying LP on A.
Then the expected error E
[
MAE(AP )
]
of the estimated truth
on AP must satisfy that
E
[
MAE(AP )
] ≤ 1
n
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
(qi × eLPi,j ),
where eLPi,j = (1 − si)
(
φj +
|Γ|

)
+ si
(
σi
√
2
pi +
|Γ|

)
, µj is
the ground truth of task Tj , σi is the standard error deviation
of worker Wi, si is the fraction of the tasks that Wi returns
non-NULL values, and φj is the deviation between µj and the
expected value E(v) of v in Equation (6).
The expected valued E(v) is decided by how v is sampled
in Equation (6). For example, if v is sampled by a uniform
distribution, then E(v) = min+max2 , where min and max
are the minimum and maximum values of Γ. We present
the proof of Theorem 2 in our full paper [43]. Intuitively,
Theorem 2 shows that the sparsity (i.e., 1 − si) affects the
error bound. In particular, for sparse answers, LP method can
incur significant inaccuracy to the estimated truth in theory.
For example, consider a simple scenario where all the workers
have the same quality, i.e., qi = 1m and σi = 1, the truths of
all tasks are 0, si = 0.1 for all workers, |Γ| = 10, and  = 1.
We have E [MAE({aˆj})] ≤ 14.13. Our experimental results
(Section VI) will also show that LP leads to high MAE of
truth inference on the sparse data.
B. Randomized Response (RR)
An alternative to realizing differential privacy is randomized
response (RR), first proposed in [48]. Intuitively, the private
input is perturbed with some known probability. However,
none of the existing randomized response solutions [47], [18],
[19], [28] has defined the probability for NULL values. We
extend the randomized response approach to deal with NULL
values. The key idea is that, given the domain of non-NULL
answers Γ, we add the NULL value as an answer to Γ. Then
given an answer vector ~ai, for each element ai,j ∈ ~ai,
∀y ∈ Γ, P r[M(ai,j) = y] =
{
e
|Γ|+e if y = ai,j
1
|Γ|+e if y 6= ai,j
(8)
Intuitively, each original worker answer either remains un-
changed in the perturbed answer vector with probability e

|Γ|+e
or is replaced with a different value with probability 1|Γ|+e .
Note that a NULL value can be replaced with a non-NULL
value, and vice versa.
Obviously, the RR approach satisfies -cell LDP. The proof is
similar to that the original randomized response approach can
provide LDP [47]. Next, we show the expected error bound
of the RR approach by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Given a set of answer vectors A = {~ai}, let
AP = {aˆi} be the answer vectors after applying RR on A.
Then the expected error E
[
MAE(AP )
]
of the estimated truth
on AP must satisfy that
E
[
MAE(AP )
] ≤ 1
n
n∑
j=1
∑
Wi∈Wj qi × eRRi,j∑
Wi∈Wj qi
,
where
eRRi,j =(1− si)
∣∣∣∣∣∣µj −
∑
y∈Γ
y
1
e + |Γ|
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
x∈Γ
siN (x;µj , σi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣µj −
∑
y∈Γ
yPxy
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where si is the fraction of tasks that worker Wi returns non-
NULL values, Pxy is the probability that value x is replaced
with y, and N (x;µj , σ2i ) = 1√2piσ2i exp
(
− (x−µj)2
2σ2i
)
is the
probability to pick the answer x from Γ by following the
normal distribution N (µj , σ2i ).
We include the proof of Theorem 3 in our full paper [43]. In
general, RR method has a large error bound of the estimate
truth, especially when the data is sparse. For example, consider
the setting where qi = 1m , σi = 1, Γ = [0, 9], µj = 0, and
 = 1. When si = 0.1 (i.e., a very sparse answer vector),
E [MAE({aˆj})] ≤ 3.551. This is large, considering the fact
that the domain size is 10.
V. MATRIX FACTORIZATION (MF) PERTURBATION
The existing works [24], [42] follow the same strategy: each
worker computes the worker profile vector locally, without any
interaction with DC. Then each worker learns the task profile
matrix from all the worker answers by iterative interactions
with DC. Though correct, this may incur high communication
cost. Therefore, we design a new protocol that does not require
the communication between DC and the workers for matrix
factorization under LDP.
Initially, DC randomly generates a task profile matrix V , which
is a d × n matrix whose values are generated independently
from the worker answers, where d is the factorization param-
eter. For each column ~vj in V , we require its 1-norm is within
1, i.e., ‖~vj‖1 ≤ 1. The purpose of this restriction is to provide
-cell LDP. When V is ready, DC sends it to each worker. This
can be done when the workers accept the tasks. Then for any
worker Wi who has his answer vector ~ai (i.e., a 1×n answer
matrix), and the matrix V from DC, he applies the MF method
to compute the worker profile vector ~ui that satisfies -cell
LDP by adding Laplace noise to the loss function (Equation
(4)), i.e.,
LDP (~ai, ~ui, V ) =
∑
Tj∈Ti
(ai,j − ~uTi ~vj)2 + 2~uTi ~ηi, (9)
where ~ηi = {Lap( |Γ| ), . . . , Lap( |Γ| )} is a d-dimensional
vector. The perturbed worker profile vector ~ui is computed
as:
~ui = arg min
~ui
LDP (~ai, ~ui, V ). (10)
Based on the perturbed worker profile vector ~ui, the perturbed
answer vector is computed as M(~ai) = ~uiV . Worker Wi
sends M(~ai) to DC. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo code.
We use gradient descent method (Line 3 - 5 of Algorithm 2)
to compute ~ui.
Algorithm 2: Matrix factorization perturbation
Require: Factorization parameter d, privacy budget , task
profile matrix V , original answer vector ~ai.
Ensure: Perturbed answer vector ~ai
1: Randomly generate a 1× d vector ~ui;
2: Generate Laplace perturbation vector ~ηi;
3: repeat
4: ~ui = ~ui − γ∇~uiLDP (γ: the learning rate);
5: until ∇~uiLDP = 0
6: return ~ai = ~uiV as the perturbed worker answers;
Next, we present Theorem 4 to formally prove the privacy
guarantee.
Theorem 4. The MF mechanism guarantees -cell LDP.
proof In order to prove that MF satisfies -cell LDP on each
answer, we first show that for any pair of answer vectors ~ai
and ~aj that differ at one element,
Pr[arg min~ui LDP (~ai, ~ui, V ) = ~u]
Pr[arg min~uj LDP (~aj , ~uj , V ) = ~u]
≤ e.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ~ai and ~aj differ at
the first element. In Algorithm 2, the perturbed factor vector ~ui
is computed by requiring ∇~uiLDP = 0. Therefore, we have:
∇~uiLDP (~ai, ~ui, V ) =
∑
Tk∈Ti
[
2(aik − ~uTi ~vk) · ∇~ui(aik − ~uTi ~vk)
]
+ 2~ηi
=
∑
Tk∈Ti
[
2(aik − ~uTi ~vk)(−~vk)
]
+ 2~ηi
= 2~ηi −
∑
Tk∈Ti
2~vk(aik − ~uTi ~vk).
Since it
must be true that
∇~uiLDP (~ai, ~ui, V ) = ∇~ujLDP (~aj , ~uj , V ) = 0.
We have:
2~ηi−
∑
Tk∈Ti
2~vk
(
aik − ~uTi ~vk
)
= 2~ηj−
∑
Tk∈Tj
2~vk
(
ajk − ~uTj ~vk
)
and ∑
Tk∈Ti∪Tj
~vk(aik − ajk) + (~uTj − ~uTi )~vk = ~ηi − ~ηj .
Since ~ui = ~uj = ~u, we have:
~ηi − ~ηj =
∑
Tk∈Ti∪Tj
~vk(aik − ajk)
‖~ηi − ~ηj‖1 ≤ ‖~v1‖1 ‖(ai,1 − aj,1)‖1
‖~ηi − ~ηj‖1 ≤ |Γ|.
Now, we are ready to show that:
Pr[arg min~ui LDP (~ai, ~ui, V ) = ~u]
Pr[arg min~uj LDP (~aj , ~uj , V ) = ~u]
=
Pr(~ηi)
Pr(~ηj)
=
∏d
k=1 exp
(
− ·|ηik||Γ|
)
∏d
k=1 exp
(
− ·|ηjk||Γ|
)
≤
d∏
k=1
exp
(
 · |ηjk − ηik|
|Γ|
)
= exp
(
 · ‖~ηj − ~ηi‖1
|Γ|
)
≤ exp () .
Therefore, ~ui satisfies -cell LDP. Since applying any de-
terministic function over a differentially private output still
satisfies DP [35], M(~ai) = ~uiV also satisfies -cell LDP.
Next, we have Theorem 5 to show the upper-bound of the
expected error of the inferred truth of the MF approach.
Theorem 5. Given a set of answer vectors A = {~ai}, let
AP = {aˆi} be the answer vectors after applying MF on A. The
expected error E
[
MAE(AP )
]
of estimated truth based on the
answer vectors perturbed by the MF mechanism satisfies that:
E
[
MAE(AP )
] ≤ q˜m(√ 2
pi
+
d|Γ|
n
)
,
where q˜ = maxi{qi} and d is the factorization parameter.
The proof of Theorem 5 can be found in our full paper [43].
Importantly, Theorem 5 shows that unlike LP and RR ap-
proaches, the error bound of the MF approach is insensitive to
answer sparsity. This shows the advantage of the MF approach
when dealing with sparse worker answers. Furthermore, the
expected error of truth inference on the perturbed data is
small. For example, consider the setting where n = 1, 000,
d = 100, |Γ| = 10 and  = 1. The expected error of the MF
mechanism does not exceed 1.8, which is substantially smaller
than that of the LP and RR approaches. Our empirical study
also demonstrates the good utility of the MF mechanism in
practice (more details in Section VI).
VI. EXPERIMENTS
A. Setup
Synthetic datasets. We generate several synthetic datasets for
evaluation. The answer domain Γ of these datasets includes the
integers from 0 to 9. For each task, we generate its ground
truth by following N (0, 1), i.e., the ground truth centers at
answer 0. By following the assumption of the truth inference
algorithm, for each worker Wi, his answers are generated by
adding the Gaussian noiseN (0, σ2i ) on the ground truth, where
σi is decided by the worker quality. We define two types of
workers, namely high-quality workers with σi = 1 and low-
quality workers with σi = 5. We pick 50% of the workers
randomly as high-quality and the rest as low-quality.
Real-world datasets. We use two real-world crowdsourcing
datasets: Web dataset and AdultContent dataset from a public
Dataset # of Workers # of Tasks # of Answers Maximum Sparsity Minimum Sparsity Average Sparsity
Web 34 177 770 0.903955 0 0.705882
AdultContent 825 11,040 89,796 0.999909 0.316033 0.993666
TABLE II: Details of real-world datasets
data repository2. In the Web dataset, 34 workers provide the
relevance score (from 0 to 4) of 177 pairs of URLs. In the
AdultContent dataset, 825 workers assign a score (from 0 to
4) of adult content of 11 thousand websites. Both real-world
datasets have the ground truth of tasks available. More details
of the real-world datasets are included in Table II.
Utility metric and parameters. We measure the MAE change
as the utility metrics. That is, we compare the MAE of the
truth inference results derived from the original answers and
that from the perturbed answers. Formally, let MAEO and
MAEP be the MAE of the truth inference results before and
after applying LDP on the worker answers. Then the MAE
change MAEC is measured as MAEC = MAEP −MAEO.
The smaller the MAE change, the better the utility. We study
the impacts of different parameters on MAEC , including the
size of the dataset, the privacy budget , and the density of
worker answers.
Compared method. We compare the performance of our per-
turbation mechanism with the 2-Layer approach [33], which is
the most relevant work to ours. The 2-layer approach assumes
the data is complete. It relies on sampling and randomized
response to realize LDP. We extend the 2-layer approach to
make it deal with NULL values by treating the NULL value
as a unique answer. Each worker samples his own probability
for NULL values.
B. Distribution Analysis of Real-world Datasets
We analyze the answer sparsity and worker answer distribution
of the two real-world datasets that we used for the experiments.
Data sparsity. We observe that both real-world datasets are
very sparse. The sparsity is measured as the fraction of NULL
values of each worker answer vector. In Table II, we report
the minimum, maximum, and average sparsity of the two
real-world datasets. In particular, the AdultContent dataset is
extremely sparse. The average sparsity is greater than 0.99,
while the maximum sparsity is as high as 0.999909 (i.e., the
worker only answers one task).
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Fig. 1: Answer distribution of the real-world datasets
2http://dbgroup.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/ligl/crowddata/
Distributions of worker answers. Figure 1 shows the answer
distribution of the two real-world datasets. The analysis shows
that the worker answer distribution of both datasets is skewed.
In both Web and the AdultContent datasets, the ground truth
of more than 72% tasks is value 0. Our analysis (Figure 1
(a) and (b)) shows that the majority of answers in theses
two datasets are correct (i.e., the same as the ground truth).
Furthermore, the remaining worker answers are distributed to
a small number of values in a non-uniform fashion.
C. Parameter Impact on Truth Inference Accuracy
In this section, we present the impact of sparsity, data distri-
bution, and data size on the accuracy of truth inference results.
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Fig. 2: Accuracy of truth inference w.r.t. different privacy budget 
(2000 workers and 200 tasks).
Impact of privacy budget. First, we vary the privacy budget
, and measure MAE change of RR, LP, and MF. Figure 2
(a) - (b) show the results on the tasks whose truth follows the
distribution N (0, 1). Overall, MF always provides the smallest
MAE change. The MAE change of LP witnesses a sudden drop
when  increases from 0.1 to 1, and keeps stable hereafter. This
is because the Laplace noise is substantial when  is small.
On the other hand, the MAE change of RR keeps decreasing
sharply with the growth of . This is because according to
Equation (8), when  is as small as 0.1, e ≈ 1. So the
probability that RR keeps an answer unchanged is close to
the probability that it substitutes the answer with a different
random value in the domain. In other words, the perturbed
answers are generated by following a uniform distribution.
When  increases, the existing values are much more likely to
be kept in the dataset than being replaced. This leads to sharp
drop of MAE change. Furthermore, when comparing Figure
2 (a) and (b), the MAE change of LP decreases when the
sparsity goes down. This is because LP replace NULL values
by following a uniform distribution over the domain [0,9] with
the mean value 4.5, which is far from the center of answers
0. Thus, it leads to larger MAE change on sparse data. In the
contrast, MF is not affected by the change of sparsity. This is
consistent with our theoretical analysis.
Impact of data sparsity. We measure the MAE change of the
three mechanisms under various answer sparsity and show the
results in Figure 3. We observe that the MAE change of MF is
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Fig. 3: Accuracy of truth inference w.r.t. different data sparsity
(2000 workers and 200 tasks)
very small in all settings. More importantly, it is insensitive to
answer sparsity. In all cases, the MAE change never exceeds
0.5, even when the sparsity is as high as 0.9. This is because
MF learns a latent joint distribution between the workers
and tasks, and predicts the missing answers accurately. In
comparison, the utility of LP and RR is sensitive to answer
sparsity. Overall, the MAE change of these two approaches
increases when the sparsity grows.
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Impact of data size. We generate the datasets that consist
of 10,000 workers and 1,000 tasks. The results for MAE
change on the datasets with different sparsity are displayed
in Figure 4. The observations are very similar to those on the
small datasets (Figure 3). We highlight the most interesting
observations. First, when  = 0.1, the MAE change of LP is
smaller when the data size is larger. LP requires to add the
Laplace noise Lap( |Γ| ) to each answer. The perturbation for
each answer is large when  = 0.1. However, for the same
task, the average of the noise is inversely proportional to the
number of answers. Therefore, when there are more answers,
the aggregate noise from the workers reduces. We also notice
that the MAE change resides in the same range for both small
and large datasets. The reason is that the noise added to each
answer is independent from the data size. We also vary the
privacy budget  on the large datasets and measure the MAE
change. The results are similar to the small datasets (Figure
2). We include the results in the full paper [43].
D. Comparison with Existing Method
We compare the MAE change of RR, LP, and MF with the
2-Layer approach [33] on the two real-world datasets. We
vary the privacy budget  and evaluate the MAE change of
the four approaches. The results are shown in Figure 5. We
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Fig. 5: Accuracy of truth inference w.r.t. privacy budget  on two
real-world datasets.
have the following observations. First, similar to the results
on the synthetic datasets, our MF approach has the lowest
MAE change for most of the cases. By matrix factorization,
the MF approach fills NULL values with non-NULL values
that follow the current answer distribution. Therefore, the
inferred truths from the perturbed answers are close to the
inferred truths of the original data, which leads to a small MAE
change. In contrast, by LP, RR, and 2-layer approaches, the
NULL values are replaced with values in the range [0,4] with
mean 2. Since the dataset is very sparse, such NULL value
replacement shifts the inferred truth closer to 2 (compared with
the inferred truth 0 from the original dataset), and thus further
away from the ground truth. Therefore, the MAE change of
these three approaches is larger than that of MF. Second, the 2-
Layer approach shows comparable MAE change as RR. This
is because it decides the privacy budget i of each worker
Wi by following a uniform distribution with mean of  and
then perturbs the answers by following randomized response.
Such data perturbation scheme introduces similar noise as RR,
especially when the number of workers is large. Third, in the
AdultContent dataset, the MAE change of the RR approach
has a sharp drop when  gets larger than 3. The reason is
that, when  gets larger than 3, RR keeps the NULL values
unchanged with high probability (approximately 80%). The
inferred truth on such perturbed dataset is very close to that
from the original dataset, which leads to smaller MAE change.
VII. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy (DP) [16] is a privacy definition that
requires the output of a computation should not allow in-
ference about any records presence in or absence from the
computation’s input. However, the classic DP model assumes
the data curator is trusted. Therefore, it cannot be adapted
to the crowdsourcing model in which the data curator is un-
trusted. Local differential privacy (LDP) has recently surfaced
as a strong measure of privacy in contexts where personal
information remains private even from data analysts. LDP
has been widely used in practice. [19] propose RAPPOR
to collect and analyze users’ data without privacy violation.
RAPPOR is built on the concept of randomized response,
which was proposed [48] initially for collection of survey
answers. RAPPOR has been deployed in Google’s Chrome
Web browser for reporting the statistics of users’ browsing
history [12]. However, RAPPOR is limited to simple data
analysis such as counting. It cannot deal with aggregates
and sophisticated analysis such as classification and clustering
[42]. Apple applies LDP to learn new words typed by users and
identify frequently used Emojis while retaining user privacy
[44]. Microsoft adapts LDP to its collection process of a
variety of telemetry data [14]. A series of work [5], [4], [37],
[46] aim to make LDP practical by improving the error of
frequency estimation and heavy hitters on the data perturbed
by LDP. Chen et al. [11] design a framework for aggregation
of private location data with LDP. Since the same location is
not equally sensitive to multiple users, the authors develop a
personalized LDP protocol based on randomized response. Qin
et al. [38] designed a protocol to reconstructed decentralized
social networks by collecting neighbor lists from users while
preserving LDP. Nyugen et al. [36] design an LDP mechanism
named Harmony to collect and analyze data from users of
smart devices. Harmony supports both basic statistics (e.g.,
mean and frequency estimates), and complex machine learning
tasks (e.g., linear regression, logistic regression and SVM
classification). Other works on LDP [19], [20], [37], [46]
only focus on simple statistical aggregation functions, such as
identifying heavy hitters and count estimation. None of these
works consider truth inference as the utility function.
The problem of protecting worker privacy in crowdsourcing
systems has received much attention recently. Kairouz et al.
[26] investigate the trade-off between worker privacy and data
utility as a constraint optimization problem, where the utility is
measured as information theoretic statistics such as mutual in-
formation and divergence. They prove that solving the privacy-
utility problem is equivalent to solving a finite dimensional
linear program. Their utility measures are different from ours
(truth inference). Ren et al. [39] consider the problem of
publishing high-dimensional crowdsourced data with LDP.
The server aggregates the data (in the format of randomized
bit strings) from individual users and estimates their join
distribution. Thus their utility function (i.e., estimation of joint
distribution) is fundamentally different from ours. Among all
the previous works, probably [33] is the most relevant to
ours. The authors propose a two-layer perturbation mechanism
based on randomized response to protect worker privacy,
while providing high accuracy for truth discovery. However,
[33] assumes that the data is complete. Be´ziaud et al. [6]
protects worker profiles by allowing the workers to perturb
their profiles locally by using randomized response. They do
not consider truth inference as the utility function.
One research direction that is relevant to our work is to
apply DP/LDP on recommender systems. The data-obfuscation
solutions (e.g. [9], [40], [41]) adapts DP to the recommender
systems and rely on adding noise to the original data or
computation results to restrict the information leakage from
recommender outputs. Shin et al. [42] focus on the LDP
setting, aiming to protect both rating and item privacy for
the users in recommendation systems. They develop a new
matrix factorization algorithm under LDP. In specific, gradient
perturbation is applied in the iterative factorization process.
To reduce the perturbation error, the authors adopt random
projection for matrix dimension reduction.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider the problem of privacy preserving
Big data collection under the crowdsourcing setting, aiming to
protecting worker privacy with LDP guarantee while providing
highly accurate truth inference results. We overcome the
weakness of two existing LDP approaches (namely random-
ized response and noise perturbation) due to worker answer
sparsity, and design a new LDP matrix factorization method
that adds perturbation on objective functions.
In the future, we plan to continue the study of privacy protec-
tion for crowdsourcing systems. We plan to design the privacy
preservation method for other truth inference algorithms, for
example, majority voting based methods [45]. We also plan
to investigate how to protect task privacy, i.e., the sensitive
information in the tasks, while allow the workers to provide
high-quality answers.
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